Strong and vehement criticisms of statistical decision-making procedures, especially those that use P -values and the level of significance (LoS) threshold of α = .05, have abounded in recent years and continues unabated to this day. For the sake of the scientific endeavor, and more importantly the search for truth through the use of data, there is therefore tremendous impetus to re-examine, and possibly to improve, these statistical decision-making procedures. This paper re-visits the fundamental problem of deciding the truth between two competing possibilities based on data. Formally, let a random observable X, taking values in a measurable sample space (X, σ(X)), be governed by a probability measure P on (X, σ(X)), which is either P0 or P1. It is of interest to determine which of H0 : P = P0 or H1 : P = P1 is the truth based on a realization of X. Alternatively, interest could be in updating the knowledge about H0 and H1. The linchpin of statistical decision-making still remains to be the Neyman-Pearson (NP) most powerful (MP) decision function, together with its power. They induce a decision process and a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) function, respectively. It is proposed that in reporting the outcome of the NP MP decision function given a specified LoS, that it should be accompanied by the value of the likelihood or log-likelihood ratio based on the decision function. The P -functional, which is the usual P -value statistic, associated with the decision process is also studied. It is pointed out that P could be used alternatively to define the NP MP decision function, but if one wants to use its value to quantify the magnitude of support for H0 or H1, then it should be the value of its density function or the logarithm of its density function, under H1, which should be reported instead. This will avoid the fallacy that a small value of P , say P = .0001, is always more supportive of H1 than of H0. It is possible that a small value of P could still lead to a value of its density, under H1, which is smaller than one, indicating more support for H0 than for H1. The important notion of replicability of results is discussed in the context of realizations of the decision function or the P -functional. It is demonstrated that a coherent manner of acquiring knowledge about H0 and H1 is via sequential learning through Bayesian updating. But it is also shown that publication or reporting bias could lead sequential updating astray in determining which of H0 or H1 is the truth. It is argued that a decision-maker can choose his own LoS, instead of using the conventional and seemingly 'carved in stone tablets' LoS of α = .05, since the additional summary measures that will accompany the realized decision will take into account whatever LoS value is chosen. Because the decision-maker is free to choose his LoS, the question of how to choose it optimally arises. Three approaches for choosing the LoS are discussed, with each approach appropriate arXiv:1910.05486v1 [math.ST] 12 Oct 2019 for a specific situation that the decision-maker encounters. As a consequence, a new approach to sample size determination is described. The ideas and proposed changes are illustrated using concrete problems, including a re-examination of Fisher's lady tea-tasting experiment, which ushered the era of the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) approach. It is hoped that the recommendations under this simple but fundamental setting of a simple null hypothesis versus a simple alternative hypothesis will extend to more complex settings, thereby helping in eliminating, or at least softening, criticisms hurled against existing statistical decision-making methods, especially those relying on P -values and an LoS threshold of α = .05.
The Search for Truth and Knowledge Representation
Apart from humankind's desire to propagate its own species or, as Richard Dawkins argues in [5] , their own genes, the search for truth and the acquisition of knowledge is one of the noblest among the multitude of human endeavors, if not its raison d'être. As John 8:32 in the Bible states: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." This passage, etched in a wall of the main lobby of the headquarters of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, should not just be the mantra of intelligence people, but it should be for all scientists trying to comprehend nature and the workings of the universe.
There are several types of truths. There are mathematical truths, called theorems, which are established through a purely deductive process using logic and starting from basic axioms and rules of operations. An example of such a mathematical truth is that √ 2 is not a rational number, a fact that is established with certainty mathematically. But there are truths, which usually correspond to physical realities, that could not be established through purely deductive reasoning, or even if they are derived through mathematical arguments, still require for their confirmations an inductive statistical approach using data obtained from observations and/or designed experiments. Professor Bradley Efron, the 2019 International Prize in Statistics awardee, refers to these type of truths as "eternal and long-lasting" during his address to the World Statistics Congress this year in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [6] . These could include physical truths arising from theoretical and mathematical considerations. An example of this is Albert Einstein's result concerning the bending of light rays due to massive bodies, a consequence of his general theory of relativity, but which still required verification based on observed data to be fully accepted by the scientific community as a truth about reality. Incidentally, this year, 2019, is the centenary of the empirical verification of this theoretical result of Einstein by the team headed by Sir Arthur Eddington based on observations about the bending of light rays during a total solar eclipse; see [19] . There are also truths which may be subject to different interpretations, such as the question of whether eating red and processed meat poses health risks to people, an issue that flared up anew with the recent publication of an article contradicting purportedly established results showing the hazards of eating red and processed meat (see [23, 3] ).
But how do we characterize or describe truths? First, truth could be in the form of mathematical formulas, a chemical structure, a biological pathway, or specified by a deterministic quantity, though the value of the quantity may not be known. Examples of these are a follows. The number of mass shootings that will occur in the United States during 2020. Again, this could be modeled by a Poisson probability function with mean rate λ. (c) The position (P OS) and momentum (M OM ) of a sub-atomic particle in a gas chamber, which according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, could only be described by a joint probability function of (P OS, M OM ). (d) The temperature at noontime on January 1, 2020 in Columbia Metropolitan Airport. This could be described by a probability distribution function, such as the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
However, even if the truth could be represented in a deterministic manner, when data are gathered through experiments for use in verifying or confirming the hypothesized deterministic representation, these data will be contaminated by measurement errors or random noise so the observables are still best described by probability distributions which are dependent on the underlying truth. For example, when Albert A. Michelson performed his experiment in 1879 to ascertain the speed of light c, his measured values were not all identical since they were the value of c but contaminated by measurement errors or random noise.
By virtue of the inductive statistical approach in determining, establishing, or confirming a truth, total certainty may not be achievable, in contrast to those obtained through a purely deductive approach such as the irrationality of √ 2. To illustrate via a very simple example, consider possessing a 'coin' which is either ordinary (with a head and a tail) or mutated (with two heads). We could not directly examine it, but we could observe the outcome (face up) when it is tossed. We could keep tossing this coin sequentially and if after n tosses we have obtained n heads, then we could not be certain that it is the mutated coin, however large n is. But, if we had observed a tail in any of these n tosses, then we will be certain that we have in our possession the ordinary coin.
In this paper we revisit the problem of determining which of two hypothesis is the truth based on data from a study, which corresponds to the Neyman-Pearson framework of decision-making in its most fundamental form. We will then discuss the notion of P -functionals, the usual P -value statistic, which have gained much notoriety, been attacked, and been blamed for the ills that have befallen the scientific endeavor; see [9, 22] . In the same token that a deeper understanding of hypothesis testing was facilitated by first considering the simple null hypothesis versus simple alternative hypothesis, which led to the Neyman-Pearson Fundmental Lemma [14] , it is our viewpoint that a clearer and better understanding of P -functionals will also be facilitated by considering this fundamental case. We will then examine ways in which we could improve the process of determining the truth based on data, address how results of statistical decision-making and observed P -functionals should be reported in order to be more informative and less misleading. We will also discuss the issue of replicability of scientific results, a concept in the forefront of what is considered good science. In the process, we will then discuss the idea of sequential learning as an effective and coherent way of getting to the truth. However, we will also demonstrate the perils of publication or reporting bias in the sequential acquisition of knowledge. A weakness of the current practice of statistical decision-making is the reliance on a cut-off value for the level of significance, usually specified to be 5%, but which is rather difficult to justify within the mathematical theory. We will therefore examine the issue of how to formally determine an optimal level of significance and thereby as a consequence also address the sample size determination problem. The ideas and recommendations will be illustrated using concrete situations, including a re-examination of the classic lady tea-tasting experiment of R. A. Fisher, which ushered the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) approach.
Experiments, Observables, and Models
We will be interested in the simplest of all decision problems: determining which of two competing simple hypotheses, denoted by H 0 and H 1 , is true. To do this determination, an experiment or study will be performed leading to observing the realization x of a random entity X taking values in a sample space X.
In parallel, we also perform another experiment leading to observing the realization u of a standard uniform random variable U taking values in U = [0, 1]. X and U are stochastically independent. Thus, the data will be (x, u) ∈ X × U. When H 0 is the truth, X is governed by a probability measure P 0 , whereas if H 1 is the truth, then X is governed by a probability measure P 1 , where P 0 and P 1 are probability measures on the measurable space (X, σ(X)). We denote by ν a measure on (X, σ(X)) which dominates P 0 and P 1 , and denote by f 0 and f 1 the probability density functions (pdfs) associated with P 0 and P 1 with respect to ν. Thus, we may re-state the decision problem as deciding between H 0 : X ∼ f 0 or H 1 : X ∼ f 1 based on the data (x, u). Note that, to be more precise, under H i , the distribution of (X, U ) is P i ⊗ λ, where λ is Lebesgue measure on (U, σ(U)), hence it has density function f i (x) with respect to ν ⊗ λ. The introduction of the parallel experiment leading to observing U is to provide a randomizer in case there is a need to randomize to make the final decision. We generate this randomizer u in conjunction with the experiment leading to x so that the use of the randomizer, if needed, does not acquire an outsize importance in the decision-making process. Thus, u could be viewed as just being a portion of the data (x, u). For a discussion of the use of randomizers in decision-making and to address criticisms of their use, see section 3 of [8] .
There is a dichotomy of what we would like to do regarding H 0 and H 1 . First, given the observed data (x, u), we may want to make a decision which of H 0 or H 1 is the truth, with proper consideration of the costs associated with erroneous choices. This is the purview of decision theory and the usual hypothesis testing approach. Second, upon seeing the data (x, u), we may simply want to update our current knowledge about H 0 and H 1 . A question arises how to represent our knowledge of which of H 0 and H 1 is the truth. We shall do so by assigning subjective prior probabilities of κ 0 and κ 1 = 1 − κ 0 , with κ 0 ∈ (0, 1) representing our prior and current belief that H 0 is the truth. Given the observed data, the result of decision function, or the value of the P -functional, the prior probabilities will then be updated, via Bayes theorem, to the posterior probabilities, which will then serve as, or could inform, the next set of prior probabilities of H 0 and H 1 to be used in the next study. This is the essence of sequential learning and updating. The first and second goals could be integrated by pre-specifying a threshold such that when posterior probabilities of either H 0 or H 1 surpasses this threshold, we then decide which of H 0 and H 1 corresponds to the truth.
Space of Decision Functions
Let G be the space [of equivalence classes] of all measurable functions from (X×U, σ(X)⊗σ(U)) into ( , σ( )) which are square-integrable with respect to P 0 ⊗λ or f 0 d(ν ⊗λ). We endow this space with the inner product given by, for every g 1 , g 2 ∈ G,
The norm for G is ||g|| = g, g . The space of decision functions for H 0 versus H 1 is the subset D of G given by
For δ ∈ D, δ(x, u) = 1(0) means to decide in favor of H 1 (H 0 ). The likelihood function associated with f 0 and f 1 will be defined via Λ(x) = f 1 (x)/f 0 (x) with the convention that 0/0 = 0. Observe that in terms of the expectation operators, we have
Given a δ ∈ D, its size and power are defined, respectively, via α δ = δ, 1 and π δ = δ, Λ .
For α ∈ [0, 1], a decision function δ ∈ D is said to be of level α if α δ ≤ α. A δ * ∈ D is a most powerful (MP) decision function of level α if α δ * ≤ α and for any other δ ∈ D with α δ ≤ α, we have π δ * ≥ π δ . We write such an MP decision function of level α as δ * (α) ≡ δ * (·, ·; α). The alternative formulation using inner products immediately indicates that if one wants to maximize the power π δ * (α) ≥ π δ among all {0, 1}-valued functions δ, then the desired δ should be 1 (0) when Λ is large (small), since the maximization problem in Lagrange form is equivalent to maximizing the mapping
In this form we see that to maximize with respect to δ, we must take δ * (x, u) = 1(0) whenever Λ(x) > (<)η for some η. This is the content of the Fundamental Lemma of Neyman and Pearson (1933) stated below. See also [11, 18] . [14] ] For α ∈ (0, 1), a necessary and sufficient condition for δ * (α) to be an MP decision function of level α for
for some c(α) ≥ 0 with α δ * (α) = α. A particular choice of this MP decision rule is
Proof. For the δ * in the statement of the theorem, and for any other δ with δ,
Expanding and re-arranging terms, we obtain that δ * , Λ − δ, Λ ≥ c(α)( δ * , 1 − δ, 1 ), and since c(α) ≥ 0 and δ * , 1 = α and δ, 1 ≤ α, then the right-hand side is at least equal to 0. Thus, π δ * = δ * , Λ ≥ δ, Λ = π δ . The particular form in (3) clearly satisfies the size condition α δ * = δ * , 1 = α.
Most often we are able to simplify this MP decision function when we could express the likelihood function via Λ(x) ≡ f 1 (x)/f 0 (x) = Q[S(x)] for some statistic S(·) taking values in a measurable space (S, σ(S)) and some measurable mapping Q from (S, σ(S)) into ( + , B + ), where B + is the Borel sigma-field of subsets of + . The set {x ∈ X : Λ(x) > c} is equal to {x ∈ X : S(x) ∈ Q −1 (c, ∞)}. If Q(·) is nondecreasing in S(·), then {x ∈ X : Λ(x) > c} = {x ∈ X : S(x) > d} for some d. Obtaining d(α) and γ(α) then becomes simpler since they are obtained under the H 0 : f = f 0 distribution of S(X), which might be easier to obtain compared to the distribution of Λ(X). The power of the level-α MP decision rule δ * (α) in (3) is given by
NP Decision Process and ROC Function
From the MP decision function given in (3), we could form a stochastic process, which will be called an NP decision process, given by
This process has right-continuous non-decreasing sample paths with state space {0, 1}. Associated with this decision process is the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) function given by
We present properties of the ROC function in the following proposition. Some of these results will be needed in establishing Theorem 8.1, a result pertaining to sequential learning. (b) α → ρ(α) is non-decreasing, concave, continuous, and is piecewise differentiable with α → ρ (α) = d dα ρ(α) non-increasing, almost everywhere (wrt Lebesgue measure); (c) lim α→0 ρ(α) = 0 and lim α→1 ρ(α) = 1;
Proof. Result (a) follows by taking the decision function δ(x; α) = α and using the condition that ν{f 0 = f 1 } > 0. For the results in (b), given α 1 < α 2 , the collection of decision functions of level α 1 is contained in the collection of decision functions of level α 2 , hence the MP decision function in the latter collection will have power at least equal to the MP decision function in the former collection. Thus, ρ(α 1 ) ≤ ρ(α 2 ). Now, let α 1 , α 2 ∈ (0, 1) and denote by δ * 1 and δ * the MP decision functions of size α 1 and α 2 . For a ∈ (0, 1), let α = aα 1 + (1 − a)α 2 and denote by δ * the MP decision function of size α. Consider the decision function δ = aδ * 1 + (1 − a)δ * . The size ofδ is aα 1 + (1 − a)α 2 and its power is aρ(α 1 ) + (1 − a)ρ(α 2 ). Since δ * is the MP decision function at size α = aα 1 + (1 − a)α 2 , andδ is also a decision function of size α, then the power of δ * is at least that ofδ. Therefore,
Since α 1 , α 2 , and a are arbitrary elements of (0, 1), then this shows that α → ρ(α) is concave. Continuity follows from this concavity. Concavity also implies that the left-hand and right-hand derivatives of ρ(α) exist, and since it could have at most a countable number of points where left-hand and right-hand derivatives are not equal, then it is piecewise differentiable. Second result in (c) follows immediately from 1 ≥ ρ(α) > α for all α ∈ (0, 1). LetΛ = sup{b ∈ : P 0 {Λ > b} > 0}. Then c(α) →Λ as α → 0, hence 
For such an α, we then have
Therefore, ρ(α)/α =Λ for all α < P 0 {Λ =Λ}, hence ρ(α)/α →Λ > 1 as α ↓ 0. Let Λ =∈ {b ∈ : P 0 {Λ ≤ b} > 0}. Then, when α ↑ 1, c(α) → Λ. If the distribution of Λ under P 0 is continuous, then
By same argument as forΛ, Λ < 1, and could take the value 0. If P 0 {Λ = Λ} > 0, then for α satisfying 1 − α < P 0 {Λ = Λ}, we have c(α) = Λ. Therefore, for α > 1 − P 0 {Λ = Λ} = P 0 {Λ > Λ}, we have
Thus, for α > P 0 {Λ > Λ}, we have
P -Functionals and their Properties
For the NP decision process ∆, we define a (random) functional via
This is the so-called P -value statistic, but we would like to stay away from this misnomer since this quantity is truly a statistic, that is, a random variable depending only on the sample data, and it is a characteristic of the decision process ∆. In terms of the P -functional, the size-α MP decision function is equivalent to
The usual approach to testing H 0 versus H 1 is to pre-specify a level of significance (LoS) α 0 , which has usually been conventionally set to 0.05, and to use a test whose size is no more than α 0 . As such, in order to gain the most power, the test δ * (·, ·; α 0 ) is utilized. We present two important distributional properties of the P -functional.
Theorem 5.1. Under H 0 , P (X, U ) has a standard uniform distribution, hence its density function under
Proof. For w ∈ [0, 1], we have
Theorem 5.2. Under H 1 , P (X, U ) has distribution ρ(·), hence its density function under H 1 is h 1 (w) = ρ (w).
Note therefore that if one could only observe the P -functional P (X, U ), the MP decision function of H 0 versus H 1 of size α 0 is, by the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, δ(P (x, u);
is a non-increasing function. This coincides with the MP decision function based on x. Note further that the existence of the P -functional has nothing to do with any pre-specified LoS. The P -functional exists whenever there is a decision process ∆. The P -functional and the pre-specified LoS only come together when a decision about H 0 and H 1 is to be made. One may think of the P -functional as a decision process-induced transformation of the original data (X, U ) into a random variable (a statistic) P (X, U ) that is uniformly distributed under H 0 and whose distribution under H 1 is stochastically smaller than a standard uniform distribution. As such there is nothing mysterious about the P -functionals (albeit, P -values) -contrary to the negative attention and notoriety it has garnered in recent years! See the recent article on P -values [22] .
That the P -functional is a statistic was emphasized in Kuffner and Walker [10] , which also demonstrated that the P -value statistic is in a one-to-one and onto (a bijection) relationship with the sufficient statistic in the case when the sufficient statistic is one-dimensional. This bijection property between the P -functional and the sufficient statistic need not hold, however, if the sufficient statistic has dimension at least 2. For example, if H 0 : µ = µ 0 , σ 2 > 0 and H 1 : µ = µ 0 , σ 2 > 0 and the data to test H 0 versus H 1 is X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ), the sufficient statistic is ( X i , X 2 i ), which is two-dimensional, and this could not be recovered if given only the P -value statistic based on the t-test of H 0 and H 1 . Note that in this case, the t-test statistic T = (X − µ 0 )/(S/ √ n) is not sufficient for (µ, σ 2 ).
Issue of Replicability
In the recent United States National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on reproducibility and replicability in science [13], a distinction is made between the notions of reproducibility and replicability. According to this report, reproducibility means being able to obtain consistent computational results using the same input data, computational steps, methods, code, and conditions of analysis; whereas, replicability means being able to obtain consistent results across studies aimed at answering the same scientific question, each of which has obtained its own data. The notion of replicability is arguably the more important one in the context of the integrity and viability of scientific results. Let us examine the notion of replicability in the context of using the MP decision function and the P -functional in deciding between H 0 and H 1 .
Consider a scientist performing a study to decide between H 0 and H 1 . Following existing decision-making procedures, he specifies an LoS to use, and assume he chooses the traditional value of α 1 = 0.05. Let (x 1 , u 1 ) be his observed data, and let
be the observed decision and the observed P -functional, respectively. Suppose it turns out that d 1 = 1. Then the scientist will conclude that H 1 is true, instead of H 0 , at LoS α 1 = .05. What does this really mean? If H 0 is in reality true, using the decision function δ(·, ·; α 0 ), there is a 0.05 chance that H 0 will be declared false; so the observed d 1 = 1 is one of these false discovery realizations. On the other hand, if H 1 is in reality true, there is a probability of ρ(α 1 ) of concluding that this is indeed the case, and the realized decision d 1 = 1 is one of these correct decisions. But this observed decision of d 1 = 1 does not preclude either of the two possibilities of H 0 or H 1 . If a second scientist performs a study with LoS of α 2 = .05 to decide between H 0 and H 1 , this scientist may get a decision d 2 = 0, which will be contradicting the first scientist's decision, and we might then say that the first scientist's result is not replicable. But if H 0 is the true hypothesis, then the result of the second scientist was highly likely (probability of 0.95 prior to performing the study); while if H 1 is true, this false negative result by the second scientist was also plausible if the power ρ(α 2 ) is not high, with this power determined by the 'effect size' or the 'distance' between f 0 and f 1 . As such the issue of replicability is a difficult question to resolve when considering the results of two scientists. Let us examine this further when there are many replications. Suppose that there are M = 100 scientists, labeled m = 1, 2, . . . , M, who will perform their own independent studies, each using an LoS of α m = .05, to decide between H 0 and H 1 , with the mth scientist using the MP decision function δ * m (α m ) = δ * m (x m , u m ; α m ) whose power is ρ m (α m ). If H 0 is true, about 5 of these scientists will obtain values of d m = 1 for their δ * m (x m , u m ; α 0 ); while, if H 1 is true, depending on their ρ m (α m )s, there will tend to be more than 5 of them with d m = 1. Under both cases, the occurrences of d m = 1 will appear in a random order for these M scientists. With many independent replications, we will better see which of H 0 or H 1 is more plausible. But, any other scientist, or even the same scientist, performing another study to decide between H 0 and H 1 may come up with a decision which disagrees with the totality of results of the M scientists. As such, when focusing on the results of individual scientists the replicability issue will always arise under both H 0 or H 1 .
The same thing happens with the P -functional. Under H 0 , P (X, U ) has a uniform distribution over [0, 1], so that any value between [0, 1] is not surprising under H 0 . Under H 1 , the distribution of P (X, U ) will be right-skewed, so smaller values will be more likely. But, with one realization of P (X, U ) that is smaller than α = 0.05, it again does not preclude either H 0 or H 1 . With 100 scientists performing independent studies and observing their P -functionals, if H 0 is true, then their observed P 's will tend to be uniform over [0, 1]; while if H 1 is true, then their observed P 's will tend to have a histogram that is right-skewed. We also reiterate that if the observed P (x, u) = p is less than α =0.05, it is faulty to state that H 0 is rejected at LoS of p. But, it is fine to conclude that H 0 is rejected at LoS of α = 0.05, provided that this LoS value was chosen prior to observing the data (x, u). The point is that the observed data should not determine the LoS that is used to make the decision.
Appropriately, the NAS Report [13] points out the difficulty in assessing the notion of replicable results. It states as follows:
Because of the complicated relationship between replicability and its variety of sources, the validity of scientific results should be considered in the context of an entire body of evidence, rather than an individual study or an individual replication. Moreover, replication may be a matter of degree, rather than a binary result of "success" or "failure."
To concretely demonstrate these issues concerning replicability, consider the two-sample problem of testing hypotheses about the difference of two population means, with the pair of hypotheses
Here σ 2 > 0 is assumed unknown. Let the sample sizes be determined according to n m ∼ P OI(λ) + 5. The possibly differing sample sizes among these M scientists is meant to model the realistic situation where they have different experimental resources available to each of them, so some will have larger sample sizes, hence will have higher powers for their decision functions. It is without doubt that there will be investigators which will have more resources, possibly due to more research funding, while others will have meager resources but would still want to contribute to the resolution of a scientific question even with their limited resources. For the mth scientist the summary statistics from the two samples will be the sample meansX m andȲ m and the sample variances S 2 mX and S 2 mY . The α-size test procedure to be used by the mth scientist is δ *
The P -functionals, which do not require randomizers because of continuity, are given by 
where T () is the associated density function for Student's t-distribution. These functions are easily evaluated using the R [16] objects pt, dt, and qt. Figure 1 plots the ROC curve and the pdfs of P m (X m , Y m ) under H 0 and H 1 for the case with n m = 5, κ = 5, σ = 5, and α = .05. Observe that the ROC curve is above the 45-degree line, while the PDF of P (X, Y ) under H 1 is right-skewed. The behaviors of the ROC function ρ(·) and ρ (·) agree with those stated in Proposition 4.1, though it should be pointed out that this two-sample t-test is not the uniformly most powerful test (UMP) of H 0 versus H 1 , but it is the UMP unbiased decision function ( [11, 18] ). The plots in Figure 2 represent the simulated results for the 100 scientists under H 0 , while those in Figure  3 are those under H 1 . An LoS of α 0 = 0.05, together with µ 0 = 0, µ 1 = 2, so κ = 2, and σ = 5, were utilized by each of these 100 scientists, though they could have also used varied LoSs. In each of these plot panels, the first represents the sequence of sample sizes n m s; the second is the sequence of decisions d m s, together with the sequence of p m s; the third is the histogram of the p m s; and the fourth is the sequence of updated probabilities of H 0 , which will be discussed in Section 8. Looking at these plots, in particular the second panel in each figure, assessing replicability of results, especially just a few results, would be a difficult matter. Under H 0 , decisions that coincide with not rejecting H 0 (d m = 0) would be assessed as replicable, but only if viewed under many replications; but, under H 1 , the correct decisions of rejecting H 0 (d m = 1) may still be considered as not replicable since there are many more replications where H 0 is not rejected owing to the moderate powers of the decision functions used.
One could argue that since we are examining the results of 100 scientists, that we ought to have adjusted for the multiple testing. However, we wanted to mimic the realistic situation where each scientist performs their own study with or without knowledge of other scientists studies, hence chooses their own LoS, which will usually be 0.05 in the existing statistical decision-making paradigm. So, how do we address the question of assessing the replicability of results? As the NAS report [13] alludes to, this should be done 'in the context of an entire body of evidence, rather than an individual study or an individual replication'. In a sense, each scientist's result should be utilized to update the current knowledge that we possess about H 0 and H 1 . As mentioned in Section 1, our knowledge of H 0 (H 1 ) could be represented by our subjective probability that H 0 (H 1 ) is true. As such upon seeing an individual scientist's result, be it the data x, the decision d, or the observed p, it should be used to update the current probability that H 0 is true. The updated probability that H 0 (H 1 ) is true will then represent the new knowledge about H 0 (H 1 ). Denote by κ 0 the prior probability that H 0 is true, and by κ 1 = 1 − κ 0 the prior probability that H 1 is true. If the observed data x is reported, then by Bayes Theorem we obtain the posterior probabilities of H 0 and H 1 via:
On the other hand, if only α 0 and d = δ * (x, u; α 0 ) are reported, then the posterior probabilities are computed via Bayes theorem according to
is the likelihood ratio based on observing δ * (X, U ; α 0 ). Observe that this updating will depend on the LoS used and the associated power or ROC value at the LoS of the decision rule. This updating rule also demonstrates the quantitative type of information obtained from a decision as a function of the LoS and power. For suppose that the decision is d = 1, i.e., reject H 0 . Observe that as α 0 → 0, κ 0 (1, α 0 ) → κ 0 /(κ 0 + κ 1 ρ (0+)), and since ρ (0+) > 1 by Proposition 4.1, then this limiting posterior probability is less than κ 0 . That is, a "reject H 0 " result with a small LoS provides evidence that H 0 is not true. In the other extreme, when d = 1 and α 0 → 1, κ 0 (1, α 0 ) → κ 0 , indicating that a "reject H 0 " result, but with a large LoS, is not informative about whether H 0 is true or false. More could be said with respect to the interplay between the LoS α 0 and the power ρ(α 0 ) and the information contained in the decision d. From the expression of Λ D in (11), observe that if d = 1 and ρ(α 0 )/α 0 is much larger than 1, then this will contribute to a big change in the updated posterior probability that H 0 is true (will decrease this probability); whereas, if 1 < ρ(α 0 )/α 0 ≈ 1, then d = 1 will not alter much this probability. When α 0 is small, then ρ(α 0 )/α 0 will tend to be large, while when α 0 is large, then ρ(α 0 )/α 0 will tend to be close to 1. The opposite holds true when the decision is d = 0, that is, "do not reject
, and since ρ (1−) < 1 by Proposition 4.1, this limit value exceeds κ 0 . That is, a "do not reject H 0 " decision with small α 0 is not informative about H 0 ; whereas, it is informative about H 0 when α 0 is large. Again, more could be said from
When α 0 is small, then this ratio is close to 1, so that it will not alter much the prior probability of H 0 in the updating; whereas, if α 0 is large and power ρ(α 0 ) at α 0 is large, then the ratio becomes small, thus contributing to a big change from prior to posterior probabilities.
These considerations indicate that it is imperative to accompany the decision d, if a decision is actually needed to be made, with the value of Λ D (d; α 0 ) or, equivalently, by log Λ D (d; α 0 ), a deviance associated with δ * (α 0 ), which measures the quality of the information about H 0 and H 1 provided by the realization of the decision function. This shows that specific thresholds on the LoS, such as the 0.05 threshold, are really not needed since whatever LoS α 0 value a scientist uses, provided it is not data-determined, will be automatically factored into the summary measure Λ D (d; α 0 ) or log Λ D (d; α 0 ). Note that the power ρ(α 0 ) of the decision function at the chosen α 0 is a critical component in this summary measure. In a similar vein that an estimate of the standard error of an estimator accompanies the estimate arising from the estimator to serve as a measure of the precision of the estimate, then log Λ D (d; α 0 ) could be viewed as a measure of the quality of the realized decision, with a large value of | log Λ D (d; α 0 )| indicating the decision d is of high quality.
If one wants to use the value p of the P -functional to update the current knowledge of H 0 and H 1 , then their posterior probabilities are computed via Bayes theorem using
Let us examine the information provided by different values of p. Recall that ρ (α) is decreasing in α under H 1 with ρ (0+) > 1 and ρ (1−) < 0 by Proposition 4.1, so that there exists an α * such that ρ (α * ) = 1. Thus, for p 1 < p 2 < α * , we will have that κ 0 (p 1 ) < κ 0 (p 2 ) < κ 0 , indicating that smaller observed P -values are more indicative that the H 0 is not true. When α * < p 1 < p 2 , then κ 0 < κ 0 (p 1 ) < κ 0 (p 2 ), so in this case, larger values of the P -functional are more indicative that H 0 is true. These results mathematically depict the information contained in the P -functional about H 0 and H 1 , and coincides with our intuition that small p-values point more towards H 1 being true, whereas large p-values are indicative of H 0 being true. However, note that this conclusion will depend on the α * satisfying ρ (α * ) = 1, and such an α * will be dependent on the ROC function of the decision process, which in turn will depend on the effect size associated with the H 0 and H 1 and usually on the sample size used in the study. Based on these considerations, just reporting the value p of the P -functional, which is the modus operandi when used in Fisher's NHST approach and in many statistical hypothesis-testing procedures, apparently is not a good approach and could in fact mislead, since users could make conclusions about the strength of evidence for or against H 0 simply based on the magnitude of p, e.g., when p = 0.0001 that H 0 is highly implausible. This fallacy is demonstrated by considering two simple alternative hypotheses, which are in the same direction. For the same observed data (x, u), the P -functional value will not change under both alternative hypotheses since it is computed only under H 0 . But, clearly, the information content about H 0 in the realized P -functional differs under the two alternative hypotheses. More ominously, one would then think that a small p will indicate more support for the more extreme alternative hypothesis, but this turns out to be not the case in general. Thus, there is something missing when we only report the realized value p, as is done in NHST and in many statistical hypothesis testing situations.
So, what might be a better approach? We propose to report as summary measure ρ (p) or log ρ (p), with a small [large] value indicating more [less] support towards H 0 . An advocate of the NHST approach might argue that this cannot be implemented since there is no alternative hypothesis under the NHST approach since it only asks if the data is consistent with the null model. But, without an alternative model the question of when an observation is inconsistent with the null model becomes problematic. For instance, suppose that the null model is that X has a standard uniform distribution. One might conclude that an outcome x in [0, .05] is an extreme realization under the model, but what about an outcome in x in [.475, .525]? Both events have the same probability of .05 under the null model! The Neyman-Pearson framework, which could be viewed as an alteration of the NHST framework, improves on the NHST approach since it insists on taking into account an alternative model, thereby eliminating the indeterminacy of what will be considered as more extreme data realizations under the null model in light of the alternative model. In addition, we point out that it is possible, for example, to have p = .0001 -which would ordinarily be interpreted as strongly supporting H 1 -but at the same time to have ρ (.0001) << 1, which is indicative of more support for H 0 . The summary measure ρ (p), or equivalently log ρ (p), is the P -based likelihood ratio, so it accounts for the distributions of P under both H 0 and H 1 ; whereas, the current practice of reporting p in isolation, provides a rudderless summary measure since it does not have the proper context to assess its informativeness towards H 0 or H 1 . Any value of p with ρ (p) = 1, or, equivalently log ρ (p) = 0, is totally uninformative about H 0 and H 1 , and such a p could possibly be close to zero, close to one, or somewhere in the middle portion of [0, 1]. Now, if one wants to make a decision between H 0 and H 1 using the value p, then he must specify an LoS α 0 and decide d = 0 [1] if p > [≤]α 0 , but he must then accompany this with Λ D (d; α 0 ) or log Λ D (d; α 0 ) as indicated earlier regarding the reporting of the result of a decision function. It is also worth noting that the value of ρ (p) plays a major role in the optimal choice of LoSs to use in a generalized Benjamini-Hochberg [1] false discovery rate (FDR) controlling procedure to optimize the global power (see Theorem 4.3 in [15] ) in a multiple testing setting, thus lending credence that the value of ρ (p) is the more important quantity instead of just the value of p itself. We note in passing that many multiple-testing procedures, including the BH procedure [1] , that corrects for multiplicity are just based on the values of the P -functional for each of the multiple tests.
In order to implement the updating rules based on observing δ(x, u; α 0 ) = d and P (x, u) = p, the quantities ρ(α 0 ) and ρ (p) need to be known. In principle, knowledge of f 0 and f 1 , which are needed for the updating based on observing X = x, is sufficient to determine ρ(α) and hence ρ (α). Since our main focus in this paper is the simple H 0 versus the simple H 1 setting, these functions will be completely known.
However, let us briefly consider a situation with a composite H 1 . Thus, suppose that X has pdf f with respect to a dominating measure ν and which belongs to a family of pdfs F = {f (x; θ) : θ ∈ Θ ⊂ } satisfying a monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property in the one-dimensional statistic S(x) (see, for instance, [11] for discussions of the MLR property), and of interest is to decide between the simple null hypothesis H 0 : θ = θ 0 and the composite alternative hypothesis H 1 : θ > θ 0 . There will be a decision process ∆ = {δ(x, u; α) : α ∈ (0, 1)} for H 0 versus H 1 of form
where c(α) and γ(α) only depends on the distribution of S(X) under H 0 . For this decision process there will be an associated ROC function which will depend on both α and θ 1 , where θ 1 is the true value of θ:
where Λ(θ 0 , θ 1 ) = Λ(x; θ 0 , θ 1 ) = f (x; θ 1 )/f (x; θ 0 ) = g[S(x); θ 0 , θ 1 ] for some g(s; θ 0 , θ 1 ) which is non-decreasing in s whenever θ 1 > θ 0 , and with the inner product defined via
Given the realized decision d based on decision function δ(·, ·; α) and realized p of the P -functional, we let
denote the log-likelihood ratios based on D = d and P = p, respectively. The dependence of each of these functions on (θ 0 , θ 1 ) will usually be through a one-dimensional parametric function ξ(θ 0 , θ 1 ), which represents the 'effect size' or the 'distance' between θ 0 and θ 1 . As summary plots to accompany the decision d or the realized P -functional p, we could provide plots of (ξ(θ 0 , θ 1 ), l D (θ 1 , ; θ 0 , α, d)) or (ξ(θ 0 , θ 1 ), l P (θ 1 ; θ 0 , p)) as θ 1 varies from θ 0 . Such plots could provide information about the quality of the information about H 0 : θ = θ 0 versus the possible values under H 1 . Values of these functions that are close to zero will not be informative, whereas large values will indicate support of H 1 , while small values will indicate support for H 0 . We illustrate the above ideas using the two-sample setting utilized in the simulation study in Section 6. For a given µ 0 , µ 1 , and σ, the standardized effect size is defined as ξ = (µ 1 − µ 0 )/σ. Given an n and α, together with the value of ξ, we obtain an expression for l D (ξ; d, α) and also l P (ξ; p). We could plot in 3-dimensional space the mappings (ξ, α) → l D (ξ; d, α) and (ξ, p) → l P (ξ; p), or we could also just create contour plots of these mappings. For aesthetic purposes, it is better to plot with respect to (ξ, log(α/(1 − α)) the l D (ξ; d, α) and (ξ, log(p/(1−p)) the l P (ξ; p). Figures 4 provides these contour plots for n = 10 and n = 20. The contour plots associated with l D (ξ, α; d) provide information regarding the quality of information about H 0 and H 1 that could be obtained from observing either a decision of d = 0 (do not reject H 0 ) or d = 1 (reject H 0 ) for pairs of values of (ξ, log(α/(1−α)); whereas, the contour plot associated with l P (ξ, p) provides information about the quality of information regarding H 0 and H 1 that one obtains for (ξ, log(p/(1 − p)). Just for reference, note that log(.05/(1 − .05)) = −2.9444.
Next, to illustrate what could transpire in practice, we generated two data sets each under the null hypothesis model (H 0 : µ 0 = 0, µ 1 = 0) and under the specific alternative hypothesis model (H 1 : µ 0 = 0, µ 1 = 5) with σ = 5 with n = 10 and n = 20. Based on the generated two-sample data sets, we determined the realized decision, d, under an LoS of α = .05, and the value of p. We provide the comparative boxplots of the two samples, together with the plot of ξ → l D (ξ; d, α) and ξ → l P (ξ; p) for different values of ξ. The realized d and p are indicated at the top of the second and third plot panels in Figures 5 and 6 .
In Figure 5 , both sample realizations with n = 10, which were generated under the null model, led to d = 0 at α = .05 and the realized P were .6153 and .4048. Looking at the plots of ξ → l D (ξ; d, α) and ξ → l P (ξ; p), these all point to support for H 0 , with the strength of support increasing as ξ increases. Also in Figure 5 where the y-sample was generated from a normal with mean 5 still with n = 10, so under H 1 , the two sample realizations still yielded d = 0 at α = .05, which are both Type II errors. The plots of ξ → l D (ξ; d = 0, α) were below zero, indicating support for H 0 . Note by the way that the dependence on the observed data of l D (ξ; d, α) is only through the value of d, so since d = 0 for the four sample realizations in Figures 5 , the plots of ξ → l D (ξ; d, α) were all identical. The realized P were .1513 and .1792, with corresponding plots of ξ → l P (ξ; p) being above zero for a small range of values of ξ, lending very mild support for H 1 , but this support for H 1 disappears and reverses to support for H 0 when ξ is increased. The intuition here is that when ξ is large, it is expected that the values of P should be much smaller than the values observed, but since they were not, then H 0 became more plausible than H 1 for the observed p. As such the information contained in the realization of P is dependent on the alternative value under consideration and the direction of support it provides, whether towards H 0 or H 1 , could even change with the same data. Figure 6 , with data generated under the null model with n = 20, led to d = 0 for both sample realizations, though for the second realization, p = .07, which converted to a mild support for H 1 when the effect size is small, and 
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Standardized Effect Size support for H 0 when the effect size is large. In Figure 6 , with data generated under the specific alternative model with n = 20, both sample realizations led to d = 1, which are correct decisions; while the realized P were about ≈ 0 and .04. When p ≈ 0, note that the plot of p → l P (ξ; p) is increasing over the range plotted, while when p = .04, it increases first, then starts to decrease and goes below zero, lending support for H 0 . In these plots, we observe that the plot of p → l P (ξ; p) either decreases immediately, or it increases first then decreases. This is a manifestation of the mathematical result pointed out earlier that, even when p is quite small, it could still lead to supporting H 0 if the effect size under consideration is quite large. This appears to be a fatal flaw of P when its exact value is used to infer about the strength of support for either H 0 or H 1 . This defect, however, is circumvented if one utilizes the value of ρ (p) or log(ρ (p)) = l P (p) to deduce the strength of support for H 0 or H 1 , or if the value p is used in the MP decision function where an LoS α is specified and H 0 is rejected whenever p ≤ α. In the latter case, whatever decision is made should be accompanied by a plot or table of values of (ξ, l D (ξ; d, α) ). Next, we present an application to the famous R. A. Fisher's lady tea-tasting experiment, which ushered the era of NHST [7, 12] . We discuss two versions of this tea-tasting experiment.
Version 1: There are eight cups on which tea has been mixed with milk. On each of these cups, the order in which the milk and the tea were placed is unknown to a lady -a lady who claims that she is able to determine, with higher probability than just guessing, the order in which tea and milk were placed. Denote by θ the probability that the lady is able to correctly determine the order in which the tea and the milk were placed. The hypothesis testing problem is to test H 0 : θ = .5 versus H 1 : θ > .5, though from the NHST framework there is just the null hypothesis H 0 but no H 1 . Let S denote the number of correct identifications by the lady. Then, under an independence assumption, S has a binomial distribution with parameters n = 8 and θ, that is, the probability mass function of S is Log of L_P at theta_1
particular, focus on the case s = 6 which corresponds to the situation where the lady correctly identifies the order of placement of milk and tea in 6 of the 8 cups. The observed randomization value was u = .973 and the realized P was p = .1416. The observed decision in this case is d = 0, so the l D -plot is below zero, though still close to zero even for θ 1 about .7, but it then decreases rapidly as θ 1 becomes larger. The associated l P -plot is the third curve from the top, which is slightly above zero, but dips below zero when θ 1 exceeds .9.
Observe that even if s = 8, corresponding to the lady correctly identifying the orderings in all 8 cups, the strength of the support for H 1 is still not strong.
Version 2: This is the version described in [7] (see also [12] ). The lady is told that out of the 8 cups, 4 of them had the tea placed first before the milk, and in the other 4 it is in the reverse order. The lady is then asked to choose the 4 cups in which the tea was placed before the milk. Let T be the number out of the four cups chosen by the lady in which tea preceded milk. Fisher introduced the notion of the null hypothesis which in this case coincides with the hypothesis that the lady does not have discriminatory abilities, hence the distribution of T under this hypothesis is hypergeometric with parameters 4, 4, and 4, that is, 8 4 , t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
H 0 is then rejected when T is large, though even this rejection criterion tacitly considers the alternative model that the lady has discriminatory powers. But one could formulate this problem more formally to accord with the Neyman-Pearson framework. When θ is the probability that the lady could determine which came first (tea or milk), then the probability mass function of T is given by
Observe that when θ = .5, p T (t; .5) is the hypergeometric distribution given in (14) . As in the binomial model, the UMP decision function of size α is of the same form with T replacing S and with p T (t; θ) replacing p S (s; θ). Figure 8 : Plots of l D (θ 1 ; s) and l P (θ 1 ; s) with respect to θ 1 for different possible realizations of T , the number of correct identifications out of the four cups chosen by the lady in the tea-tasting experiment as described in [7] . For l D , an LoS of α = .05 was used. For the l D plot, the upper curve is for t = 4 with d = 1 (H 0 : θ = .5 was rejected), while the lower curve is for t ≤ 3 with d = 0 (H 0 not rejected). In Fisher's experiment, the observed value of T was t = 3.
Log of L_D at theta_1
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The profiles obtained for this version of the experiment are similar to the binomial version as shown in Figure 8 . For the observed value of t = 3 and with randomization value of u = .815, the decision is not to reject H 0 at LoS of α = .05 and the realized P is p = 0.2007. This result could be considered as inconclusive since we note that the associated l D (θ 1 ) is close to zero. The same conclusion arises by looking at the second curve from the top in the l P (θ 1 ) plot which is also close to zero. If the lady had instead obtained t = 4, which would have coincided with the correct identifications for all 8 cups, then there would have been a stronger support for H 1 based on these profile plots.
Sequential Learning
The Bayes updating formulas in (9), (10), and (12) when given x, d, or p, respectively, can be used to sequentially update the knowledge about H 0 and H 1 as results of other studies are sequentially obtained. The current posterior probabilities will become the prior probabilities at the beginning of the next study, and the result of this new study, whether x, d, or p, will be used to update these prior probabilities. The beauty of this approach is that whatever study is performed, so long as it is performed with integrity and honesty, whether it is a study with large or small sample sizes, will be able to contribute to the updating of the knowledge about H 0 and H 1 . Theorem 8.1 states that if H 0 [H 1 ] is true, and provided that the initial prior probabilities of H 0 and H 1 are not 0 nor 1, then the sequence of posterior probabilities for H 0 [H 1 ] will converge almost surely to 1. As such, one could specify a threshold > 0, say = .0001 or determined in considerations of the cost consequences of decisions, such that when either posterior probability exceeds 1 − , a final conclusion on the truth or falsity of H 0 and H 1 is made. This sequential approach to learning about the truth states of H 0 and H 1 is depicted in the flowchart in Figure 9 .
We will now establish Theorem 8.1. We do so by establishing some intermediate results. We will assume the following set of conditions: 
(iii) For the mth study (m = 1, 2, . . .), X m = (X mj , j = 1, 2, . . . , n m ), which are IID random variables from f , are observed.
(iv) The observables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m , . . . are independent of each other.
(v) The initial prior probabilities κ 0 and κ 1 = 1 − κ 0 are in (0, 1).
We denote by δ * m (·, ·; α m ) the size-α m MP decision function and by ρ m (α m ) its associated (power) ROC function. The ROC function of the decision function based on only one observation will be denoted byρ(·). We also denote by
the likelihood ratio for the mth study, with Λ(x) = f 1 (x)/f 0 (x).
Proof. The second inequality has already been established in Proposition 4.1. The first inequality follows from the fact that the size-α MP decision function based on only one observation belongs to the collection of all size-α decision functions based on n m observations. As such the power of the MP decision function in this collection is at least equal to all other decision functions in this collection, in particular, the MP decision function based only on one observation. 
Since {log Λ(X mj ), j = 1, . . . , n m ; m = 1, 2, . . .} are IID random variables and by the condition that 
Proof. It is easy to see that the mapping y → g(y) = α log(y/α) + (1 − α) log((1 − y)/(1 − α)) for α ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (α, 1) is decreasing in y. Consequently, using this result, Lemma 8.1, and the first condition of the Lemma,
By the second condition of the Lemma, we have To demonstrate the phenomenon described in Theorem 8.1 empirically, we refer back to the fourth panels of Figures 2 and 3 . These panels depict the sequence of posterior probabilities for H 0 updated from the sequence of decisions d m s and also the sequence of realized P -functionals p m s. Observe that the plot of these posterior probabilities with respect to m are wiggly for small m, but starts stabilizing and converging to 1 when H 0 is true and to 0 when H 0 is false. Through sequential updating, the issue of whether a specific result is replicable or not becomes a moot point, since whatever that result, so long as it was obtained with integrity and honesty, it will contribute to the updating of the knowledge about H 0 and H 1 , in essence, it becomes a data point for the search for truth. 9 Impact of Publication or Reporting Bias Theorem 8.1 points to a coherent and sensible approach to sequentially acquiring knowledge about H 0 and H 1 in the sense that if more and more studies are conducted, then the sequence of posterior probabilities of H 0 [H 1 ] will converge to 1 under H 0 [H 1 ]. But, what could potentially derail this approach? The reality of the publication process of manuscripts submitted for publication or just on the reporting of results of studies is the existence of a bias against results that are 'not-significant'. This means that if a study resulted in a decision d = 0, then there is a smaller chance that this result will be published or reported compared to when the decision is d = 1. Similarly, studies with large observed P -functionals have smaller chances of getting reported or published. Such studies whose results do not get published or reported could therefore not be used in the posterior probability updating of the knowledge about H 0 and H 1 . What will be the impact of this?
Recall that we denoted by
the log-likelihood ratio based on observing the decision function, so D = δ * (X, U ; α). When there is no bias in the publication or reporting process, then, under H 0 , D has a Bernoulli distribution with success probability of α. We have used this result to show that, under H 0 , by using Jensen's Inequality, we have E 0 (V ) < 0. This is the reason why, under H 0 , the sequence of posterior probabilities converges almost surely to 1.
But consider a simple model where a publication or reporting process bias exists. Thus, upon observing D, which is governed by the probability P 0 (more precisely, P 0 ⊗ λ), there is a second stochastic step which determines whether the result of the study will be reported or not. This step will depend only on the observed value of D. Let I = 1(0) if the result of the study is published or reported (not published nor reported). We suppose that the conditional probability distribution of I, given D, is given by Q(I = 1|D = 1) = η 1 = 1 − Q(I = 0|D = 1); Q(I = 1|D = 0) = η 0 = 1 − Q(I = 0|D = 0), where 0 ≤ η 0 < η 1 ≤ 1. We denote by P * 0 the probability measure that governs (D, I) under P 0 . Under this model, we will only be able to observe D if I = 1. Thus, the observable D * , which equals D when I = 1, possesses the probability distribution, under H 0 , given by P * 0 (D * = 1) = P * 0 (D = 1|I = 1) =
Observe that since η 0 < η 1 , we have P * 0 (D * = 1) > α, indicating that the desired size of α is not anymore satisfied if D * is the variable that is observed instead of D. Denote by
the observable log-likelihood ratio, purportedly based on D. With E * 0 (·) denoting expectation with respect to the probability measure P * 0 , we have
We already know that E 0 (V ) < 0, but because of the above inequality, we could not anymore guarantee that E * 0 (V * ) < 0, that is, it could be that E * 0 (V * ) > 0. An extreme case of this situation is when η 1 = 1 and η 0 = 0, where studies that do not lead to rejections of H 0 are never getting published nor reported, while those that lead to rejections of H 0 are always getting published or reported. In this extreme case we will have
Note that this situation is not outside the realm of possibilities. Imagine, for instance, the situation where a well-respected research team, headed by a prominent Nobel-prize winning scientist, have just published a study which led to the rejection of H 0 . Subsequent studies by other research teams that did not lead to the rejection of the same H 0 may then never see the light of day -for how could they go against the established research team? But, it is possible that the well-respected research team has committed an error of decision in rejecting H 0 , since there are no certainties in decision-making based on data. Now, in such cases where E * 0 (V * ) > 0, there is the possibility that, even under H 0 , the sequence of posterior probabilities of H 0 , based on a sequence of V * 1 , V * 2 , . . ., may converge to 0, instead of 1. Let us also examine the case with P -functionals. We have shown that E 0 [log ρ (P )] < 0 using Jensen's Inequality and the uniformity of P under H 0 . In the presence of publication or reporting bias against large P 's, with I indicating once more if the result of a study is published or reported, suppose that Q(I = 1|P = p) = g(p), p ∈ (0, 1), with g(·) not identically equal to 1 almost everywhere and g(p) is non-increasing in p. Note that g(p) ≤ 1 hence 1 0 g(p)dp < 1. These conditions imply that smaller values of P lead to higher chances of getting published or reported. Let us denote by P * the published or reported P , and denote by P * 0 the probability measure induced by P 0 and Q that governs (P, I) under H 0 . Then, the probability density function of P * , under H 0 , is given by h P * (p) = (1)g(p) 1 0 (1)g(w)dw ≡ḡ(p), p ∈ (0, 1).
Since g(·) is non-increasing, then, for every p ∈ (0, 1), p 0ḡ (w)dw ≥ p 0 (1)dw = p, with strict inequality for some p. Thus, under H 0 , P * is stochastically smaller than P . Since p → log ρ (p) is non-increasing, then it follows that
Note that this result also follows from the fact that if V 1 st < V 2 and if a(·) is an integrable non-increasing function, then E[a(V 1 )] > E[a(V 2 )]. Thus, even if E 0 [log ρ (P )] < 0, there is no more guarantee that E * 0 [log ρ (P * )] < 0. In fact, consider an extreme case where we take g(p) = I{p ≤ c} where c ∈ (0, 1) is such that ρ (p) > (<)1 when p < (>)c. Then, in this case, we will have
Thus, in the presence of publication or reporting bias, we could have E * 0 [log ρ (P * )] > 0, and so it is possible that the sequence of posterior probabilities of H 0 updated from a sequence of P * 1 , P * 2 , . . . may converge to 0, instead of 1, even under H 0 .
Considerations on the Choice of LoS
If possible, it would be preferable to adhere to the principle that a mathematical theory of statistical decisionmaking or of updating knowledge about H 0 and H 1 should not rely on arbitrary constants which cannot be justified within the theory -for if it does the theory becomes mathematically 'impure'. The rationale behind the conventional choice of α = 0.05, or some other small value such as 0.01 or 0.10, for the LoS in existing statistical decision-making procedures is in order to put an upper bound to the probability of committing a Type I error, which occurs when H 0 is rejected when it is in fact true, considered to be a more serious type of error than a Type II error, which is accepting H 0 when in fact it is false. However, this arbitrary choice of α = 0.05 is difficult to justify within the theory and it could be viewed as a stain in existing statistical decision-making methods and perhaps could be their Waterloo. This choice has been the source of controversies and criticisms of existing hypothesis testing methods. Criticizing the use of such a threshold, Professor John Ioannidis [9] wrote:
... the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for a p-value less than 0.05.
The attacks on P -values and the LoS threshold of α = .05 has in fact continued unabated. Recently, there was the editorial article by Wasserstein, Schirm and Lazar [22] with the provocative title: Moving to a World Beyond "p < 0.05". See also the many articles in The American Statistician issue in which [22] appeared, which deal with P -value controversies, criticisms, and proposed changes. The paper [21] also discusses reasons why the NHST approach is an unsuitable tool in scientific research. But, see also the papers of [2, 4] that provide comparisons, contrasts, and reconciliations of the NHST, Neyman-Pearson, and Bayesian approaches to statistical decision-making.
So, how should one choose an LoS value to use? As pointed out earlier, any decision-maker could choose any LoS he desires since whatever his choice is will be properly taken into account in the log-likelihood ratio based on d. So, the appropriate question is whether there is a way to choose an LoS value to optimize the information that the decision-maker could acquire from his study. We will argue below that it should depend on the major goal of the decision-maker and the viewpoint of his decision-making process.
Game-Theoretic Approach
If the decision-maker desires to make an immediate decision between H 0 and H 1 based on his study, then he should consider the cost consequences of his possible decisions. Thus, suppose that C ij is the cost incurred by deciding for H j when H i is the truth, with C 01 > C 00 and C 10 > C 11 . The specification of the cost consequences of decisions should reflect the relative severities of the possible decisions under the two possible states of reality. For the decision function δ * (α), the expected costs or risks under H 0 and H 1 are, respectively,
If the decision-maker supposes that he is making his decision against an adversary who controls the choice of which of H 0 or H 1 will be the truth and whose intent is to maximize his cost, or if he simply wants to be as conservative as possible, then he should utilize an LoS α which will minimize his maximum risk, a minimax approach. The appropriate α M is then given by
If the curves α → R 0 (α) and α → R 1 (α) intersect over α ∈ [0, 1], then the value of α M is the α satisfying R 0 (α) = R 1 (α). There will be a point of intersection if C 10 ≥ C 00 and C 01 ≥ C 11 (for instance, when C 00 = C 11 = 0), and α M satisfies the equation
On the other hand, if C 11 ≥ C 01 , then α M = 1; while if C 00 ≥ C 10 , then α M = 0.
Bayes Approach
An alternative for the decision-maker is to define a weighted expected cost or risk, where the risks under H 0 and H 1 are weighted by the respective prior probabilities of H 0 and H 1 , resulting in the Bayes risk for δ * (α), given by
The decision-maker could then choose the α minimizing BayesRisk(α), denoted by α B . Here, κ 0 represents the decision-maker's prior probability that H 0 is true. The solution is the α B that satisfies
This choice of LoS, denoted by α B , leads to the decision function δ * (α B ) which coincides with the Bayes decision function, which is the one minimizing the Bayes risk among all decision functions (see, for instance, [18] ). An indirect argument for this result is that Bayes decision functions are also of the form of the MP decision functions, hence since we minimized the Bayes risk among the MP decision functions, the α B in (19) therefore finds the Bayes decision function.
Optimizing Knowledge Accrual
Another alternative for the decision-maker is to focus instead on optimizing the change that will accrue about his knowledge of H 0 or H 1 based on the result of his decision function. It is then sensible to choose an LoS α such that the expected log-likelihood ratios, based on D, under H 0 and H 1 , achieve their maximum difference. The expected log-likelihood ratio based on D, under H 0 and H 1 , are respectively,
The difference between these two expected log-likelihood ratios is
The decision-maker could then choose the α that maximizes D(α), that is,
Note that in this approach for choosing the LoS, no consideration is given to the cost consequences of the decision since the main focus is to optimize the gain in accrued knowledge about H 0 and H 1 from the result of the decision function.
Sample Size Determination
An important issue that arises is that of determining the proper sample size n to use in a given study. The ROC function ρ(·) depends on such a sample size, so that we may write ρ(α; n) and ρ (α; n). In each of the approaches for determining the LoS to utilize, the optimal α will then also depend on n, so we may write this as α * (n). We could then determine the appropriate sample size n * by specifying a lower bound b > 0 for the logarithm of the odds-ratio and letting
This sample size determination approach is in contrast to existing procedures where an LoS value is specified, usually to be α = .05, and a lower threshold for the power is also specified, say 0.95, and then the desired sample size is determined.
Concrete Example
We demonstrate the ideas in this section by using a simple normal model. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be IID N (µ, σ 2 ) with σ 2 known, and consider the problem of deciding between H 0 : µ = µ 0 versus H 1 : µ = µ 1 with µ 1 > µ 0 . Since the sample meanX is sufficient for µ, we reduce the problem to just havingX ∼ N (µ, σ 2 /n).
The MP decision function of size α is
whose associated ROC function is, with ξ = (µ 1 − µ 0 )/σ being the standardized effect size,
Its derivative is
We now determine α M , α B , and α D according to the prescriptions in subsections 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3, respectively.
To determine α M we need to solve the equation
with R 1 = (C 01 − C 00 )/(C 10 − C 11 ) and R 0 = (C 10 − C 00 )/(C 10 − C 11 ). Letting w = Φ −1 (1 − α), so that α = 1 − Φ(w), the resulting equation to be solved with respect to w is
). This equation could be solved numerically, e.g., via Newton-Raphson algorithm, to obtain w M , from which we then obtain α M = 1 − Φ(w M ). In the special case where R 1 = 1 and R 2 = 1, which arises when C 01 = C 10 > 0 and C 00 = C 11 = 0, we directly obtain w M = ξ √ n/2 leading to
To determine α B , we need to solve the equation
Using the expression in (23) , and solving directly for α B , we find that
In the special case when R 3 = 1, such as when κ 0 = 1/2, the least favorable prior, and with C 01 = C 10 > 0 and C 00 = C 11 = 0, we obtain
thus coinciding with the special case for α M . For α D , we need to find the maximizer of the mapping α → H(α) with
Observe that H(α) > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1); lim α↓0 H(α) = 0, and lim α↑1 H(α) = 0 by Proposition 4.1. Differentiating H(α), we obtain
.
From the special case when solving for α B , we have ρ (α) − 1 = 0 satisfied by α * = Φ(−ξ √ n/2), and for this α * we have ρ(α * ) = 1 − α * and α * = 1 − ρ(α * ), so that H (α * ) = 0. Furthermore, since H (α) goes from positive values to negative values as α goes from 0 to 1, then in fact α * = Φ(−ξ √ n/2) is the maximizer of α → H(α). Therefore, we have shown that
This solution coincides with the solutions for α M and α B under the special cases arising from κ 0 = 1/2, C 01 = C 10 > 0, and C 00 = C 11 = 0. Note that the α D does not depend on κ 0 and the C ij 's since its derivation does not take into account the decision-maker's cost consequences of his decision and his prior knowledge about H 0 . To be able to concretely compare the values of α M , α B , and α D , we obtain them under this normal one-sample setting and for different combinations of values of C 01 , C 10 , κ 0 , n, and ξ = (µ 1 − µ 0 )/σ, the effect size. We set C 00 = C 11 = 0. The computation of α M utilized the Newton-Raphson algorithm. Table  1 summarizes the values obtained under the different scenarios. From this table, observe that as the effect size increases, the LoS values from each of the three approaches decrease. Furthermore, note that when ξ = .5 and under the case where C 01 = C 10 = 1, κ 0 = .5, the LoS values are much larger than α = .05. The reason for this is that with these higher LoS values, more information accrues based on the outcome d of the decision function compared to when α = .05. In addition, notice the drastic change in α M and α B when the cost consequences are not equal compared to when they were equal. In essence, the choice of LoS should depend the other elements of the decision problem, hence a fixed threshold of α = .05, for whatever decision problem at hand, is just untenable and unjustifiable.
Depending on which rationale the decision-maker uses for his determination of his LoS α * , he could then determine an appropriate sample size for his experiment or study according to the formula (21) in subsection 10.4. We demonstrate this for the case of α D , which also happens to be the same solutions for α M and α B in special case where C 01 = C 10 = 1 and κ 0 = .5. Given a lower bound b > 0, from (21), we seek the smallest integer n satisfying Φ(ξ √ n/2)
Directly solving this inequality, the desired sample size n * = n * (b) is the smallest integer at least equal tō
For this sample size, determined by specifying the lower bound b, we find that
When b = 6, this becomesn
For this b = 6 andn(b = 6), we obtain α D (b = 6) = 0.0474 and ρ(α D (b = 6)) = 0.9526. Recall that in the usual sample size calculation where we specify the LoS to be α = .05 and with the power to be 1 − β = .95, the required sample size is the smallest integer at least equal tõ
Interestingly, if one wants the b that will lead to an LoS of exactly α = .05, we find that you should take b = 2 log(95/5) = 5.8889, which is a rather mysterious number (at least compared to the perfect number 1 b = 6), lending further mystery to the common, typical, conventional, and age-old choice of an LoS of α = 0.05!
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Humankind's desire to acquire knowledge in the pursuit of the truth of whatever phenomenon is at hand, be it about "eternal and long-lasting truths" according to Efron, or of matters more ethereal and temporally of passing interest, such as President Trump's income taxes, is deeply ingrained in our DNA. The search for truth has especially both fascinated and confounded us all in the past few years, what with Trump's adviser Rudy Giuliani exclaiming on national television about "Truth isn't Truth" or with the proliferation of fake news for nefarious purposes which are unwittingly being facilitated by technological platforms in the social media arena. In fact, even in books and fictional novels, the search for truth is of paramount interest. Indeed, from the best-selling fictional novel titled The Art of Racing in the Rain by Garth Stein [20] , which has been adapted for film by Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures and released this year, we encounter a dialogue involving the main canine character, Enzo:
"Inside each of us resides the truth," I began, "the absolute truth. But sometimes the truth is hidden in a hall of mirrors. Sometimes we believe we are viewing the real thing, when in fact we are viewing a facsimile, a distortion. As I listen to this trial, I am reminded of the climactic scene of a James Bond film, The Man with the Golden Gun. James Bond escaped his hall of mirrors by breaking the glass, shattering the illusions, until only the true villain stood before him. We, too, must shatter the mirrors. We must look into ourselves and root out the distortions until that thing which we know in our hearts is perfect and true, stands before us. Only then will justice be served."
The development of appropriate methods useful in the search for truth and the acquisition of knowledge using data is one of the foremost, if not the main, goal of statisticians. We, statisticians and data scientists, must continue re-examining existing methods and refine them if there are problems, so that we may facilitate the 'breaking of the glass and the shattering of the illusions'. Controversies have arisen in the use of existing statistical procedures for decision-making, especially those that utilize P -values and the setting of hard thresholds, such as α = .05, for the level of significance. Thus, there is a need to re-examine these existing procedures to determine if they could be improved or altogether replaced by newer methods. This paper is in this spirit. It re-examined existing statistical decision-making approaches in the most fundamental of settings, that of deciding between, or sequentially acquiring knowledge about, two simple hypotheses. It is expected that the clarity provided by dealing with this fundamental setting will result in improving methods for more complicated settings, in a similar vein that the Neyman-Pearson Fundamental Lemma [14] enabled the solutions of hypothesis testing problems in complicated settings.
The Neyman-Pearson MP decision function for deciding between two simple hypotheses is still the linchpin of the theory of statistical decision-making. The classical approach is to specify the LoS α, which is the maximum allowable probability of a Type I error. One then looks for that decision function that maximizes the power under H 1 , the MP decision function. It turns out, however, that the more beneficial approach is to consider the stochastic process of MP decision functions indexed by α and to look at the receiver operating characteristic function of the decision process, which is the power of the MP decision function as a function of α. We then clarified the notion of the P -functional, usually called the P -value statistic, as a functional of the decision process. The notion of replicability was then examined in the context of observing the outcomes of a decision function and the P -functional. We concur with the NAS report [13] that replicability should be viewed in 'the context of an entire body of evidence, rather than an individual study or an individual replication.' This led to the question on how the results of studies should be reported. We argued that when reporting the outcome of the decision function, that it is imperative to accompany it with the value of either the likelihood ratio or the logarithm of the likelihood ratio based on observing the decision function. This value will provide a measure of the strength of support, either for H 0 or H 1 , given the decision. Whatever LoS value is used will be automatically incorporated into this summary measure, so that a decision-maker is actually free to choose whatever LoS value he desires, so long as it is not decided after seeing the data.
If one wants to report the value p of the P -functional, this should simply be used to make the decision, which is to reject H 0 if and only if p is no more than the specified LoS α, which in fact corresponds to the decision made using the level α MP decision function. The value itself of p could be misleading in terms of the information it provides about whether the results of the study supports H 0 or H 1 . For instance, it is possible that p = 0.0001, but this could still be more supportive of H 0 than of H 1 . Rather, what should be reported is the value of the P -functional density under H 1 , given by ρ (p), or equivalently log ρ (p), which is actually the likelihood ratio or the log-likelihood ratio, respectively, based on observing the P -functional. This quantity is more informative compared to just the value of p. Furthermore, log-likelihood ratio profile curves or contour plots could also be provided, especially when dealing with composite alternative hypothesis.
Discussion was then presented on updating knowledge of H 0 and H 1 when given the realization x of the random observable X, the value d of a decision function δ * (α), or the value p of the P -functional, via Bayes theorem. It is demonstrated that a coherent way of acquiring knowledge about H 0 and H 1 is through this process of sequential learning, where the current state of knowledge of H 0 and H 1 are updated, using Bayes theorem, when results from new studies are reported. It is established that if there is no publication or reporting bias, then the sequence of posterior probabilities will converge to 1 (0) if H 0 is true (false). Through sequential learning, any study performed with integrity and honesty, whatever its results, will contribute to the acquisition of knowledge about H 0 and H 1 . This is the ideal situation of a community of researchers, both cooperatively and competitively, seeking the truth about a certain phenomenon. However, it was also demonstrated that in the presence of publication or reporting bias, a monkey-wrench is thrown into the knowledge updating that, even under H 0 , it is possible to have the sequence of posterior probabilities of H 0 to converge to 0, instead of 1.
It was argued that a decision-maker is free to choose any LoS value that he desires since it will automatically be accounted for by the likelihood ratio based on the realized decision which should accompany the decision. In essence, decision-makers should not consider an LoS value of α = .05 as having been 'carved on stone tablets.' In fact, insisting on α = .05 which is a value not justifiable within the theory of statistical decision-making, renders the mathematical theory 'impure', and this has led to controversies and criticisms. The question therefore arose on how a decision-maker could optimally choose his LoS. Three approaches were discussed for determining such an optimal LoS, each depending on the viewpoint that the decisionmaker is operating on. These approaches led to LoS values which are justifiable within the theory, thereby making the theory 'beautiful' and free of arbitrary inputs. With these approaches to deciding on the LoS, a new procedure for sample size determination was also developed. The ideas in this paper were demonstrated using concrete examples pertaining to a two-sample problem, a one-sample problem, and the famous Fisher's lady tea-tasting experiment. It is hoped that the ideas presented and the proposed changes could improve existing statistical decision-making methods and hopefully eliminate, or at least lessen, the criticisms being hurled against these existing statistical decision-making methods.
